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STATUS AND CONTRACT IN AN EMERGING
DEMOCRACY: THE EVOLUTION OF DISPUTE
RESOLUTION IN GHANA
©Paul F. Kirgis*
Abstract
Ghana is one of the developing world’s success
stories. The first sub-Saharan colony to gain
independence, it is a stable democracy experiencing
sustained economic growth. Yet as Ghana reaches
for the material gains of participation in modern
commercial life, its dual legal systems—the system
of customary adjudication by traditional authorities
and the formal court system—have come under
increasing pressure. New legal developments have
truncated the authority of traditional decisionmakers, while an overburdened court system lacks
the resources to fill the resulting adjudicative gaps.
To solve the problem, Ghana is now experimenting
with a system of quasi-public dispute resolution,
including contractual arbitration and courtconnected mediation. If successful, this experiment
could provide a model for other emerging
democracies seeking to promote greater access to
justice while integrating traditional and national
adjudicative structures.
“[T]he movement of progressive societies has
hitherto been a movement from Status to Contract.”
-Henry Sumner Maine1
*

Professor of Law and Faculty Chair of the Hugh L. Carey Center for
Dispute Resolution, St. John’s School of Law. I am grateful to Jacqueline
Nolan-Haley and Rev. James Kwasi Annor-Ohene for sharing their research,
and to Dennis Lynch and the Giving to Ghana Foundation for supporting the
trainings and research in Ghana. Janai Nelson, Jeff Walker, Jacqueline NolanHaley, Elayne Greenberg, Ran Kuttner, Robin Cooper, and the participants in a
faculty workshop at St. John’s University provided valuable comments on this
article.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

In declaring that progressive societies move from status to
contract, Henry Maine meant that the societies of western Europe
had transitioned from legal systems in which the parties’
relationships to one another defined the scope of their rights and
obligations to systems in which the parties defined their own rights
and obligations, within broad parameters. Leaving aside the
question of whether such a transition could take place in any
society—let alone whether such as transition is inevitable in every
society—Maine’s famous dictum captures a fundamental
distinction between traditional societies, which tend to be
organized hierachically based on family, clan and tribe
relationships, and modern Western societies, which tend to be
organized individually based on markets and legal rights. Those
organizational structures reflect important differences in the values
motivating social action. Traditional societies tend to emphasize
the values of community and religious observance, while Western
societies place more importance on personal autonomy and the rule
of law.
Centuries of Western influence and interference have left
few purely traditional societies intact. Colonial powers typically
retained traditional structures as a means of local control, while
superimposing formal governing institutions on the Western model
to protect colonial interests. The result was the development of
dual legal systems, with traditional structures remaining rooted in
community and religious values and national courts promoting
autonomy through the application of positive law.2 As the
comparatively young nations of the developing world strive for the
material benefits of participation in the modern global economy,
these dual legal systems have come under increasing pressure,
buffeted by a range of disruptive social forces, including
migration, urbanization, and demands for recognition from women,
ethnic minorities, and other outsider groups. The integration of
these dual systems poses one of the most important challenges
developing countries face.

1

HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 164-165 (10th ed. 1884).

2

See John Griffiths, What Is Legal Pluralism, J. LEGAL PLURALISM &
UNOFFICIAL L. 1, 6 (1986)
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Among the emerging nations, Ghana stands out as model
worth watching. The first sub-Saharan African colony to achieve
independence, Ghana has a history of relative stability. It has
largely avoided the wrenching ethnic conflicts that have enveloped
other African countries in the post-colonial period. Breaking the
pattern of autocratic rule punctuated by military coups-d’etat,
Ghana has seen two decades of peaceful democratic government,
leading to impressive economic growth and development.
Now, as it looks to take the next steps in its development,
Ghana is embarking on an experiment in the use of alternative
dispute resolution to bridge the divide between the traditional and
formal legal systems. It has instituted a regime of court-connected
ADR that simultaneously incorporates the traditional authorities
into the formal court structure and promotes Western-style
arbitration and mediation as alternatives to both those traditional
authorities and the courts. If the experiment succeeds, it could
provide a model for other emerging nations to follow.
This article analyzes the Ghanaian ADR experiment. It
grows out of a series of mediation trainings conducted at the
Marian Conflict Resolution Center in Sunyani, Ghana, a city of
approximately 250,000 and the capital of the Brong-Ahafo region
in southwest Ghana, in 2011 and 2012. I participated as a member
of a team consisting of Ghanaian law professors and faculty from
St. John’s University School of Law and Fordham University
School of Law.3 Participants in the trainings included legal aid
mediators, chiefs, priests, and professionals from academia and
medicine. Inaugurated by Chief Justice Georgina Wood of the
Supreme Court of Ghana, the trainings qualified graduates to serve
as court-connected mediators under the Ghana ADR Act. The
trainees, like others serving as court-connected mediators and
arbitrators around the country, will be in the vanguard of a cadre of
dispute resolution professionals offering a new, hybrid form of
3

The trainings were led by Professors Elayne Greenberg and
Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, of St. John’s and Fordham, respectively, and
Professors Nene Amegatcher and Michael Owusu of the Ghana School of Law.
Many contributed to the project, including Rev. James Kwasi Annor-Ohene,
who coordinated our attendance at the trial described here, among many other
things. Funding for the trainings was provided by the Giving to Ghana
Foundation, the Hugh L. Carey Center for Dispute Resolution, and the Feerick
Center for Social Justice.
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dispute resolution, blending elements of both the traditional system
and Western processes.
To provide context for the analysis, I will begin by
describing a traditional adjudication our group attended in the
court of the Queen Mother of Sunyani, a small city in the mostly
rural Brong-Ahafo region of Ghana, West Africa. My goal in this
section is to show how customary adjudicators, while employing
processes featuring many of the same mechanisms as Western
adjudication, resolve disputes on the basis of values widely
divergent from those seen in Western courts. I will then explain
those different value systems using models developed by
prominent contemporary social psychologists. Finally, I will
describe the new ADR scheme and discuss some initial research
into its practical implementation. Although it is too soon to
evaluate the plan, the preliminary findings suggest that the new
processes have the potential to address at least some of the demand
for effective dispute resolution not being met by the courts and
customary adjudicators.
II.

A ROUTINE AFRICAN TRIAL

Nana Yaa Nyamaa II, the Paramount Queen Mother of
Sunyani, holds court on Tuesday evenings. She is heir to a
tradition of tribal chieftancy that goes back centuries in Ghana.
Enstooled in 1972 at age 17, she is part of the extensive hierarchy
of Ashanti traditional authorities. Members of the Akan people, the
largest ethnic group in Ghana, the Ashanti are the traditional tribal
power in Ghana. The Ashanti had unified most of the modern
territory of Ghana in the nineneenth century under their king, the
Asantehene, who ruled his dominions from the Golden Stool in the
Ashanti capital of Kumasi.4 They remain the most influential
cultural force in Ghana today.
The Queen Mother’s court is held in a large, open-air
gazebo at her “palace,” a small compound centered around her
ranch-style home. Chiefs and queen mothers sit atop the social
structure in Ghana and are often well-off in relative terms.5 Most
4

WILLIAM BURNETT HARVEY, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN GHANA 67
(Princeton 1966).
5

Candidates for chief are nominated by a queen mother (who may or
may not be the king’s mother but is normally a relation) out of eligible
candidates determined according to lines of matrilineal descent. The chief is

4
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real property in Ghana is held in a system of allodial and
usufructory rights, with the land ultimately vested in the “stool” on
behalf of the entire community, living and dead. Male chiefs hold
legal title in a capacity similar to a trusteeship.6 They are entitled
to rents from the land, now collected in the form of taxes.7
Although they have lost much of their governing power, they
remain essential adjudicators, hearing disputes involving Ghana’s
still vibrant customary law.
Queen mothers function like male chiefs, with certain
differences. Queen mothers customarily have not been able to hold
property, so they depend on the chief in their locale for financial.
In addition, queen mothers were not included in the regional
councils created by the English colonial administration, so they are
not part of the governing structure in the same way as the men.8
Despite these limitations on their power, queen mothers are
widely-respected decisionmakers. Lacking customary jurisdiction
then elected by a council made up of the heads of the main lineages in an area.
The highest chief in a particular area is called the paramount chief. See Ernest
Kofi Abotsi & Paolo Galizzi, Traditional Institutions and Governance in
Modern African Democracies: History, Challenges, and Opportunities in
Ghana, in THE FUTURE OF AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW 268 (Fenrich, Galizzi,
and Higgins, eds. Cambridge 2011).
6

See JANINE UBINK, IN THE LAND OF THE CHIEFS: CUSTOMARY LAW,
LAND CONFLICTS, AND THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN PERI-URBAN GHANA 21-22
(Leiden Univ. Press 2008). Approximately 80% of land in Ghana is held by
chiefs in this way.
7

Subject to this allodial title, freeholders have usufructory rights that
are perpetual and inheritable and allow use and development subject only to
certain restrictions imposed by the chief. Joseph Blocher, Building on Custom:
Land Tenure Policy and Economic Development in Ghana, 9 YALE H.R. & DEV.
L.J. 166, 179-180.
8

The English used pre-colonial rivalries among the various tribes to
gain control over most of the area of modern Ghana without the use of violence.
They promised smaller tribes protection from the Ashanti in exchange for the
acceptance of colonial recognition of the tribes’ chiefs. They then required the
chiefs to seek formal installment by the colonial authorities, a process that
ultimately allowed the English to co-opt the chiefs as surrogate colonial
administrators. In turn, by invoking their own duty of protection promised to the
smaller tribes, the English justified military action to subdue the Ashanti,
fighting a series of wars that finally resulted in the capture of the Golden Stool
and the unification of the country under English rule in 1901. See Abotsi &
Galizzi, supra note , at 273.
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to hear land disputes, they hear mostly disputes involving family
and commerce—traditionally the bailiwicks of women in Ghana.
Men tend to take their disputes to chiefs; women tend to take theirs
to queen mothers.
On this particular Tuesday, Nana Yaa is hearing a case
involving two women, a wholesaler of dried fish and a retailer who
had been unable to pay for a quantity of fish bought on credit. The
wholesaler has brought her suit to the Queen Mother and paid the
customary “token,” a combination filing fee and consent to the
Queen Mother’s jurisdiction. The retailer has similarly accepted
the Queen Mother’s jurisdiction by paying her own token.
The Queen Mother sits on a slightly elevated chair with
symbols representing her stool and a Catholic cross behind her,
signifying her sources of authority. Six elders—five women and
one man—surround her. Like all Akan chiefs and queen mothers,
she has a linguist who serves as intermediary between her and the
parties, required because in all formal settings chiefs and queen
mothers do not communicate directly with an audience.9 The
proceedings, conducted in the local language of Twi, open with the
two parties taking an oath similar to the traditional AngloAmerican courtroom oath.
The complainant speaks first. She explains that she sold
about $1000 worth of dried fish to the retailer on credit. The
retailer repaid half the amount on schedule but then stopped
making payments. Eventually, the retailer repaid an additional
$200, leaving a debt of about $300. The wholesaler went with her
son to the retailer’s home to demand payment of the remaining
debt. When they got to the home, they found the retailer making a
large pot of soup. This infuriated the wholesaler, who was being
pursued by her own creditor (a fact the retailer didn't know), and
who did not have enough money to feed her own family. She
picked up the pot of soup, took it off the stove, and threatened to
take it with her. At her son’s urging, however, she relented and put
the soup bowl down the floor. The retailer responded by calling the
wholesaler a witch, a serious charge. At least as much as the
unpaid debt, it is this insult that has provoked the wholesaler to
bring her case to the Queen Mother.
9

See KWESI YANKAH, SPEAKING FOR THE CHIEF: OKYEAME AND THE
POLITICS OF AKAN ROYAL ORATORY 8 (1995).
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As the complaining wholesaler states her case, the Queen
Mother occasionally interjects, through her linguist, to ask
questions. At one point, the Queen Mother disallows a part of the
wholesaler’s testimony as hearsay. The retailer is then given a
chance to cross-examine her before stating her own case. She
explains that she was unable to make sales for a time because her
father had died, a fact the wholesaler did not know. She expresses
her outrage at the wholesaler’s conduct in threatening to remove
the soup. Taking the food from another person’s house is a gross
breach of local custom and tradition—a breach that, in the
retailer’s telling, justified her charge that the wholesaler was a
witch. After she finishes her statement, the wholesaler is given a
chance to cross-examine.
The case turns, dramatically, on the testimony of the only
non-party witness called to testify, the wholesaler’s son. His
testimony is devastating to the wholesaler. He says that he had
advised her not to take the soup and that he was ashamed when she
did. The two women stand stiffly while he delivers this indictment.
When he finishes, he asks for permission to speak with the two
women privately. The proceedings are temporarily adjourned while
he and the two parties leave the court to converse. They return with
a proposed settlement. The son has agreed to take out a loan to
give to his mother so that she can afford to supply new fish to the
retailer, which will allow the retailer to resume sales and repay the
wholesaler from the future profits. The retailer promises to pay in
installments.
But the parties’ agreement does not end the matter. The
Queen Mother retains jurisdiction, and must accept any settlement.
She indicates that she would have found for the respondent
because taking another person’s food from her house is so contrary
to customary law that the retailer was justified in calling the
wholesaler a witch. The Queen Mother forces the wholesaler to
kneel before her and apologize to the Queen Mother, as
representative of the community, for that breach of customary law
before accepting the proposed settlement.
III. NORMS, LAWS, AND PROCESSES IN A PLURALISTIC DISPUTE
RESOLUTION SYSTEM
The proceedings before the Queen Mother had most of the
features of formal adjudication. The Queen Mother’s court, like all
chiefs’ courts in Ghana, is legally a part of Ghana’s official system
7
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of justice. British colonizers coopted the chiefs in the former Gold
Coast more than a century ago and incorporated them into the
proto-national government.10 Lacking either the means or the
desire to govern the local matters that affected the populace on a
day-to-day basis,11 the British left the indigenous legal system
intact, but subordinate to a “formal” English legal system imposed
from outside.12
When it gained independence in 1957, the nation of Ghana
kept this basic structure intact.13 The exogenous, Anglo-American
style court system the British created was retained. A Supreme
Court with five appointed judges sits at the top, with mid-level
appellate courts below and then a cluster of trial courts including
high courts, circuit courts, and district courts, in descending order

10

HARVEY, supra note , at 196. Using recognition and installment as
the fulcrum, they created regional councils, including chiefs, to collect the taxes
that funded the stools and oversaw the native courts. When the Gold Coast
became the first sub-Saharan colony to achieve independence in 1957, the new
nation of Ghana retained this basic structure. The regional councils continue to
be the link between the chieftancy and the state today. See Abotsi & Galizzi,
supra note , at 275-76.
11

This tension was not unique to African colonies; it percolated
throughout the empires of the European powers, leading to a variety of strategies
for reconciling the traditional and received legal systems. See Brynna Connolly,
Non-State Justice Systems and the State: Proposals for a Recognition Typology,
38 CONN. L. REV. 239, 247-48 (2005). Some imperial powers simply abolished
the traditional systems, by either statute or judicial decision invalidating
traditional laws and customs. Others incorporated customary rules and/or
procedures into the formal adjudicative system either in whole or in part. Still
others allowed the traditional systems to continue to operate without any
integration into the state system. Id.
12

See WILLIAM BURNETT HARVEY, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN
GHANA 69-70 (Princeton 1966). The policy of indirect rule in Africa was
initially formulated by Sir Frederick Lugard in the northern region of Nigeria.
Id.
13

The new government promulgated extensive rules for choosing
between customary and common law, which was defined to include the same
body of statutory law covered by the Courts Ordinance. Id. at 254, 266-67. In
addition, the British requirement that customary law be pleaded and proved
through witnesses when issues of customary law arose in the state courts was
dropped and customary law instead treated as a matter of law for the court to
determine. Id. at 267.
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of jurisdictional power.14 At the same time, Ghana’s Constitution
provided that “[t]he institution of chieftaincy, together with its
traditional councils as established by customary law and usage, is
hereby guaranteed.”15 The chiefs’ primary governing responsibility
today is dispute resolution, through the process officially known as
customary arbitration.16 The courts have the power to review
customary awards on grounds that the award “was made in breach
of the rules of natural justice, constitutes a miscarriage of justice,
or is in contradiction with the known customs of the area
concerned.”17
The chiefs’ courts have most of the formal trappings of
adjudication, notwithstanding the appellation “customary
arbitration.” Given the power of compulsory process by the
Chieftancy Act, chiefs can compel participation in arbitrations
before them upon pain of both legal sanction and social
retribution.18 Their awards are enforceable as judgments. Parties
pay filing fees and take oaths, and basic standards of due process
are enforced, including notice and the right to be heard and a right
of confrontation. Basic rules of evidence are followed.
Despite the overlapping processes, however, customary
arbitration differs from adjudication in the formal court system in
14

Richard C. Crook, Access to Justice and Land Disputes in Ghana's
State Courts: The Litigants' Perspective, 50 J. LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL
L. 1, 5 (2004).
15

Id. Art. 270.

16

JANINE UBINK, IN THE LAND OF THE CHIEFS: CUSTOMARY LAW,
LAND CONFLICTS, AND THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN PERI-URBAN GHANA 156
(Leiden Univ. Press 2008). The chiefs’ formal judicial power has been nearly
eliminated over the years, so that today, chiefs have judicial power only in
chieftancy disputes. For other disputes, chiefs can act as arbitrators. See Abotsi
& Galisi, supra note , at 278.
17

Ghana ADR Act § 112(1).

18

The Supreme Court of Ghana struck down the provision giving
chiefs the power to impose criminal penalties on parties that fail to appear in
July 2011. Nevertheless, chiefs still have substantial power to compel attendance
at customary arbitrations. One legal aid mediator I met told of a lawyer who
refused to submit to customary arbitration. When his grandmother later died,
the chief refused to permit her to be buried in her home community. The lawyer
swallowed his pride and went to the chief to ask forgiveness so that his
grandmother could rest with her people.
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critical ways. Most importantly, the values and norms underlying
both the process and the applicable legal rules rest on different
foundations.
Social psychologists have posited that all human societies
rest on a handful of bedrock moral norms that serve to justify and
constrain action. In the liberal west, moral theorizing tends to focus
on two sets of moral concerns: first, the obligation not to harm
others; and second, the obligation to be fair to others. But Jonathan
Haidt has shown that these are just two of five sets of moral
concerns that animate societies around the world. In Haidt’s words:
In addition to the harm and fairness foundations,
there are also widespread intuitions about ingroupoutgroup dynamics and the importance of loyalty;
there are intuitions about authority and the
importance of respect and obedience; and there are
intuitions about bodily and spiritual purity and the
importance of living in a sanctified rather than a
carnal way.19
Haidt was building on the work of Richard Shweder, who posited a
threefold division of moral concerns. Steven Pinker summarizes
Shweder’s ethical categories as follows:
Autonomy, the ethic we recognize in the modern
West, assumes that the social world is composed of
individuals and that the purpose of morality is to
allow them to exercise their choices and to protect
them from harm. The ethic of Community, in
contrast, sees the social world as a collection of
tribes, clans, families, institutions, guilds, and other
coalitions, and equates morality with duty, respect,
loyalty, and interdependence. The ethic of Divinity
posits that the world is composed of a divine
essence, potions of which are housed in bodies, and
that the purpose of morality is to protect this spirit
from degradation and contamination.20
19

Jonathan Haidt, The New Synthesis in Moral Psychology, SCIENCE,
New Series, Vol. 316, No. 5827 (May 18, 2007), pp. 998-1002, at 1001.
20

STEVEN PINKER, THE BETTER ANGELS OF OUR NATURE: WHY
VIOLENCE HAS DECLINED 625 (2011).
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Pinker melds Shweder’s ethics and Haidt’s moral
foundations with the system of relational models proposed by Alan
Fiske. Fiske argued that people understand their relationships—and
in so doing justify their actions—according to four models:
Communal Sharing, Authority Ranking, Equality Matching, and
Market Pricing. Again, Pinker summarizes:
When people adopt the mindset of Communality,
they freely share resources within the group,
keeping no tabs on who gives or takes how much . .
. . Authority Ranking [] is a linear hierarchy defined
by dominance, status, age, gender, size, strength,
wealth, or precedence. It entitles superiors to take
what they want and to receive tribute from inferiors,
and to command their obedience and loyalty. . . .
Equality Matching embraces tit-for-tat reciprocity
and other schemes to divide resources equitably. . . .
Market Pricing [is the] system of currency, prices,
rents, salaries, benefits, interest, credit, and
derivatives that powers a modern economy.21
Combining these different approaches, Pinker creates a sort
of map of moral concerns, with the goal of providing “a grammar
for social norms”:22
Shweder’s
Ethics

Divinity

Haidt’s
Moral
Foundation

Purity/
Sanctity

Fiske’s
Relational
Models

Community

In-Group
Loyalty

Authority/
Respect

Communal Sharing

Authority
Ranking

Autonomy

Harm/
Care

Fairness/Reciprocity

Equality
Matching

Market Pricing/
Rational-Legal

Pinker argues that cultures differ from one another in the relative
weight they assign these different moral values. Western liberalism
21

STEVEN PINKER, THE BETTER ANGELS OF OUR NATURE: WHY
VIOLENCE HAS DECLINED 627-28 (2011).
22

STEVEN PINKER, THE BETTER ANGELS OF OUR NATURE: WHY
VIOLENCE HAS DECLINED 626 (2011).
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emphasizes the values on the autonomy end of the spectrum, while
most other cultures (including western conservatism) give at least
as much weight to the values associated with divinity and
community.23
In Ghana, as in traditional societies generally, the values
associated with sanctity and community predominate. Ghanaians
tend to be highly religious, with Christianity the most prevalent
religion. Reverence for ancestors is strong, as is respect for
authority and for elders. Honor, hospitality, and gratitude underlie
social interactions, with elaborate rituals for everything from
greeting strangers to the rites of passage associated with birth,
adulthood, marriage, and death.24 While personal autonomy is
important—no one wants to be violated, physically or otherwise—
it is but one of many concerns, and often not the most important.
As the custodians of “customary law,”25 the chiefs and
queen mothers must concern themselves with the entire range of
those values. Customary law has been defined as “the body of law
deriving from the local customs and usages of the various
traditional communities in Ghana” and as “a set of established
norms, practices, and usages derived from the lives of people.”26 In
turn, customary law is incorporated into the positive law. Ghana’s
23

STEVEN PINKER, THE BETTER ANGELS OF OUR NATURE: WHY
VIOLENCE HAS DECLINED 631-33 (2011).
24

See ASIRIFI-DANQUAH, GHANA’S CULTURAL HERITAGE IN
RETROSPECTIVE 96-120 (2008).
25

The Courts Ordinance promulgated by the British in 1935 directed a
law court faced with an issue of customary law to “call to its assistance Chiefs
or other persons whom the Court considers to have special knowledge of native
law and custom” and allowed courts to refer questions of customary law to a
competent “Native Court.” See WILLIAM BURNETT HARVEY, LAW AND SOCIAL
CHANGE IN GHANA 246 (1966). Customary law had to be pleaded and proved in
the law courts as a question of fact until 1960, when law courts were give the
power to decide matters of customary law
26

Joseph B. Akamba & Isidore Kwadwo Tufuor, The Future of
Customary Law in Ghana, in THE FUTURE OF AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW
(Fennich et al. eds 2011). In practice, the system tended to be bifurcated along
racial, ethnic, and religious lines. Disputes involving only members of the
indigenous community were handled through traditional processes applying
customary laws, while disputes involving members of the colonizing community
were handled through the imported system of courts and laws. See HARVEY,
supra note , at 201-02.
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current Constitution provides that “[t]he common law of Ghana
shall comprise the rules of law generally known as the common
law, the rules generally known as the doctrines of equity and the
rules of customary law,” the latter consisting of “the rules of law,
which by custom are applicable to particular communities in
Ghana.”27 The traditional adjudicators link the underlying
community values to the formal law.
The case in the Queen Mother’s court shows how, in the
performance of that function, customary adjudicators consider
values that western courts ignore. Consider how the dispute
between the wholesaler and the retailer would be resolved in a
western court. The dispute would likely end up in a small claims
court. The court would focus on the retailer’s status as debtor,
applying legal rules rooted in the values associated with fairness,
equality matching, and market-pricing. The wholesaler’s threat to
remove the soup would likely be ignored as irrelevant, while the
wholesaler’s grievance about being called a witch would not rise to
the level of actionable slander, because it would fail the legal
requirement of financial damage associated with the value of
harm/care.
In the Queen Mother’s court, liability for the debt played a
decidedly secondary role, as both the disputants and the tribunal
focused on the threatened removal of the soup. That action
contravened social norms associated with communal sharing:
entering another family’s home and taking their food violates the
27

Constitution of the Republic of Ghana Art. 11(2)-(3) (1992). The
courts have the power to reject a rule of customary law on grounds that it is
counter to public policy as determined by reference to modern social conditions.
Joseph B. Akamba & Isidore Kwadwo Tufuor, The Future of Customary Law in
Ghana, in THE FUTURE OF AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW 217 (Fennich et al. eds
2011). In the words of Justice Taylor of Ghana’s Supreme Court, “If customary
laws are to develop to meet the demands of a civilized populace and if they are
to play any meaningful role in a concerted national effort to clean our country of
corruption and unsavory practices, then we must endeavor to remove these
artificial barriers that tend to block away and disable us from carrying out our
functions.” Sarkodie I v. Boateng II, G.L.R.D. 73 (1982), quoted in Akamba &
Tufuor, supra note , at 214. For example, in one case the Court of Appeals
rejected a local custom allowing a landlord to remove valuable crops grown by a
tenant, declaring that “the customary law . . . became outdated and ceased to be
law as soon as conditions in society changed so as to make it unreasonable for
persons to conduct themselves by it.” Attah v. Esson, 1G.L.R. 128, 133 (1976),
quoted in Akamba & Tufuor, supra note , at 215.
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family group bond reinforced by rituals such as commensal mealtaking.28 The “witch” epithet—which under other circumstances
would transgress norms associated with divinity and sanctity—was
then considered and justified as a legitimate response to the breach
of customary norms.
Further, the disposition of the case required the Queen
Mother to perform a social role far removed from the legal
remedies available to a judge hearing a case raising similar
contract and tort claims in a court of law. Despite the parties’
agreement on a settlement restoring the business relationship, the
case was not resolved until the Queen Mother received an apology
from the wholesaler, setting the stage for the reintegration of the
wholesaler into the community. That is a function that judges in
courts of law—whether in the U.S. or in Ghana—do not and
cannot perform. Like western courts, the courts of law in Ghana
enforce contract and tort remedies that resolve disputes through the
retrospective application of rules of law to determined facts, with
damages or the adjustment of legal rights the typical remedial
measures.29 In contrast, traditional dispute resolution emphasizes
the goals of reconciliation and reintegration. Remedies tend to look
forward, with the goal of reestablishing harmony within the
community.30 A chief or a queen mother is not merely a
representative of the government tasked with applying rules of law,
but the instantiation of the community, tasked with upholding
community norms and standards.
The similarities in process between customary courts and
courts of law can thus mask important differences in social role.
Customary adjudicators publicly recognize and enforce social
norms within defined communities. Those norms are rooted in a
range of values, from community and sanctity to autonomy. Judges
in the western-style courts of law make factual determinations and
28

Pinker at 627.

29

See Hon. Yaw Appau, Assessment of Damages (Paper Presented at
Induction Course for Newly Appointed Circuit Court Judges at the Judicial
Training
Institute),
available
at
http://jtighana.org/new/links/papers/ASSESSMENT%20OF%20DAMAGES%2
0-Justice%20Yaw%20Appau.pdf.
30

VOLKER BOEGE, TRADITIONAL APPROACHES TO CONFLICT
TRANSFORMATION—POTENTIALS AND LIMITS 7 (Berghof Research Center for
Constructive Conflict Management 2006).
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apply rules of positive law that have been imposed from above and
that rest, to a much greater degree, on autonomy-based values such
as fairness and market-pricing. Each regime has an important role
to play in Ghana’s dispute resolution structure. For reasons I will
explain in the next section, both systems have come under
pressure, necessitating Ghana’s ADR experiment.
IV. A DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYSTEM UNDER PRESSURE
Customary adjudicators like the Queen Mother of Sunyani
are essential cogs in Ghana’s national machinery of dispute
resolution. The trial courts are overwhelmed by the number of
cases, particularly land cases, filed each year. Low settlement rates
exacerbate the problem, leaving cases to languish for years in the
resulting backlogs.31 As a result of the judicial backlog and the
inaccessibility of the courts to much of the populace, in many
cases, a chief or queen mother may be the only practical dispute
resolution option. Chiefs and queen mothers are widely respected
as decisionmakers.32 A recent survey found that 76.4% of surveyed
people would go to the chief if they had a land problem, as long as
the chief did not have a personal stake in the matter.33
As Ghanaian society undergoes the rapid changes brought
about by development and modernization, however, the traditional
dispute resolution system is also coming under increasing pressure.
Some of this pressure is the product of deliberate legislative
change. One prominent example is the Intestate Succession Law of
1985, which was crafted to counteract the discriminatory effects of
customary intestacy law on women. Under customary law, a
widow of an intestate decedent had no claim to the marital
property, which belonged exclusively to the husband’s blood
family. The family had a customary obligation to support the
widow, but with the dislocations of modern life, that obligation
was often ignored, leaving widows destitute.34
31

Id. at 6-7.

32

JANINE UBINK, IN THE LAND OF THE CHIEFS: CUSTOMARY LAW,
LAND CONFLICTS, AND THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN PERI-URBAN GHANA 156
(Leiden Univ. Press 2008).
33

UBINK, supra note , at 156 (Leiden Univ. Press 2008).

34

See Akua Kuenyehia, Women, Marriage, and Intestate Succession in
the Context of Legal Pluralism in Africa, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 385, 391-92
(2006).
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Under the Intestate Succession Law, widows are entitled to
keep a share of their “self-acquired” property, but not of the
“lineage” property. Self-acquired property is “that which a person
acquires through his own expertise, without any help or assistance
from his [lineage] property, or by gift to himself personally.”35
Lineage property is the property of the husband’s blood family, as
determined among the Akan through matrilineal succession.
Lineage property is “that which has been inherited and which from
that point is managed by the lineage as a corporate body through
the lineage head or representative.”36 This alteration of customary
principles contradicts traditional norms about the roles of women
that have deep roots in Ghanaian life. It requires fact-finding and
application of legal rules that fit uncomfortably with the customary
legal regime.
Economic growth itself also serves to undermine traditional
practices. For example, with the surging value of urban land, chiefs
have increasingly attempted to sell stool lands for personal gain,
even where those lands are under cultivation by community
members who have been working them for generations.37 And the
influx of foreign investment puts added pressure on the social
structures bonding local communities, as evidenced by the recent
conflicts over alleged illegal gold mining by Chinese prospectors.38
These disruptions are manifested in changing patterns of
dispute resolution. As effective as customary arbitration can be in
resolving local disputes like the one in the Queen Mother’s court in
Sunyani, it is ill-suited to the resolution of disputes arising under
positive law, to disputes in which chiefs are parties, and to disputes
between local community members and outsiders. The result is an
increasing resort to courts saddled with inadequate resources and
inefficient processes.39 The legal issues raised by the newly
35

Jeanmarie Fenrich and Tracy E. Higgins, Promise Unfulfilled: Law,
Culture, and Women’s Inheritance Rights in Ghana 25 FORDHAM INT’L L.J.
259, 288 (2001), quoting CHRISTINE OKALI, COCOA AND KINSHIP IN GHANA:
THE MATRILINEAL AKAN OF GHANA 12, 15 (1983).
36

See Fenrich & Higgins, supra note , at 314-20.

37

See UBINK, supra note , at 86-87, 128.

38

See Adam Nossiter & Bree Feng, Ghana Arrests Chinese in Gold
Mines, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2013, at A11.
39

See UBINK, supra note , at 176-77.
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available legal rights, such as the proof problems inherent in
proving that marital property is “self-acquired,” serve to heighten
the litigiousness.40
The very values that undergird traditional Ghanaian life
seem to contribute to the judicial morass. Litigation in Ghana is
distinguished by its startlingly low rates of settlement. In contrast
to the United States, where at least 40% of civil cases filed in
federal court are settled,41 less than 10% of Ghanaian lawsuits are
settled.42 While there is no definitive answer to the question of why
the settlement rate is so low, the reason seems at least partly
related to a desire for authoritative decisions and a fear of
noncompliance with contractual settlements.43
As it continues to develop and grow, Ghana faces an
ongoing challenge in integrating its legal systems and providing
access to justice. Greater mobility among the populace,
immigration, and increased trade both within the country and
across borders will test traditional systems of value, initiating
conflicts not easily resolved by resort to traditional norms in
traditional processes, and putting added pressure on a court system
that is already overburdened.
These are challenges that all developing countries face. As
one of Africa’s success stories, Ghana has the potential to emerge
as a model for other developing countries, both in Africa and
around the world. In 2012, Ghana experienced a third successive
peaceful and democratic Presidential election, and it has seen
average annual economic growth of 6.5% since 2000.44 The
discovery of oil has pushed that growth into double figures in
recent years, though with the attendant risks of corruption that
40

Id. at 316-20.
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See Gillian K. Hadfield, Where Have All the Trials Gone?
Settlements, Nontrial Adjudication, and Statistical Artifacts in the Changing
Disposition of Federal Civil Cases, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES 705, 732-33
(2004).
42

See Crook, supra note 14, at 17.
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See Crook, supra note 14, at 14.
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This figure is reported by the African Development Bank, available
at
http://www.afdb.org/en/countries/west-africa/ghana/ghana-economicoutlook/.
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come with the exploitation of natural resources in developing
countries. The country has largely avoided the crippling ethnic and
religious conflicts that have consumed other West African
nations.45 Significant problems remain, to be sure, with
employment, public health, and environmental sustainability
topping the list of concerns.46 But Ghana has a head start on most
countries in Africa in the construction of the stable and inclusive
political and economic institutions that are the foundations of a
successful modern state. For these reasons, Ghana’s response to
the challenges of legal integration merits attention.
V.

AN EXPERIMENT IN QUASI-PUBLIC DISPUTE RESOLUTION

In recent years, Ghana has embarked on an experiment in
the integration of traditional and state legal systems under the
rubric of alternative dispute resolution. The primary vehicle for
this experiment is the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2010
(the “Ghana ADR Act”), an ambitious attempt to standardize the
provision of commercial arbitration, mediation, and customary
arbitration nationwide.47 It has simultaneously limited and
formalized the adjudicative power of the chiefs and created a
system of quasi-public, Western-style ADR, with arbitration and
mediation conducted under the auspices of the courts. The goal is
45

Lawrence Juma, Africa, Its Conflicts And Its Traditions: Debating A
Suitable Role For Tradition In African Peace Initiatives, 13 MICH. ST. J. INT’L
L. 417, 421 (2005)(estimating that one quarter of African nations were
experiencing civil strife in 2005). Despite its relative stability, Ghana has not
entirely escaped civil strife. See Ulrike Schmid, Legal Pluralism as a Source of
Conflict in Multi-Ethnic Societies, 46 J. LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 1,
5 (2001)(describing a series of ethnic conflicts in northern Ghana culminating in
a civil war in 1994).
46

Id.
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The ADR Act is the culmination of a multi-year process of
increasing access to alternative dispute resolution, beginning with the Courts
Act of 1993, which encouraged judges to promote settlement of civil lawsuits.
See Courts of Act of 1993, Act 459 (Ghana), Sec. 73(1) available at
http://ghanalegal.com/?id=3&law=116&t=ghana-laws (“Any court with civil
jurisdiction and its officers shall promote reconciliation, encourage and facilitate
the settlement of disputes in an amicable manner between and among persons
over whom the court has jurisdiction.”). For an overview of the development of
the national ADR program, see Jacqueline Nolan-Haley & James Kwasi AnnorOhene, Procedural Justice Beyond Borders: Mediation in Ghana, __ HARVARD
NEGOTIATION LAW REVIEW (Online Article) __ (2014).
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to reduce the burden on courts by creating a regularized system of
ADR encompassing both traditional norms and processes and
norms derived from liberal, western legal systems.48
In many ways, the commercial arbitration provisions of the
Ghana ADR Act reflect western standards for commercial
arbitration. For example, in language not unlike sections 2 and 3 of
the Federal Arbitration Act, the Ghana ADR Act provides that
arbitration agreements are irrevocable49 and requires a court in
which a suit has been brought to refer the matter to arbitration if it
determines that the claim is covered by a valid arbitration
agreement.50 And the Ghana ADR Act codifies the separability
principle of Prima Paint, declaring that “an arbitration agreement
which forms or is intended to form part of another agreement,
shall not be regarded as invalid, non existent or ineffective
because that other agreement is invalid or did not come into
existence or has become ineffective and shall for that purpose
be treated as a distinct agreement.”51 Like the UNCITRAL
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration,52 the Ghana
ADR Act incorporates the kompetenz-kompetenz doctrine, giving
the arbitrators the power to determine their own jurisdiction.53
In other respects, however, the Ghana ADR Act envisions a
different relationship between private arbitration and the courts
than western arbitration law contemplates. The Act excludes
certain classes of cases from arbitration, including matters
48

See CJ Asks Ghanaians to Patronise Alternative Dispute Resolution,
GhanaWeb,
Oct.
6,
2010,
available
at
http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=194
762.
49

Ghana ADR Act § 3(2).
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Ghana ADR Act § 6.
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Ghana ADR Act §3(1).
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UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration
Art. 16(1)(2006).
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Ghana ADR Act § 24 (“Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the
arbitral tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction, particularly in respect of (a) the
existence, scope or validity of the arbitration agreement; (b) the existence or
validity of the agreement to which the arbitration agreement relates; (c) whether
the matters submitted to arbitration are in accordance with the arbitration
agreement.”).
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“involving the national or public interest” and environmental
matters, in addition to “any other matter that by law cannot be
settled by an alternative dispute resolution method.”54 More
significantly, the Act grants courts a greater supervisory role in the
arbitration process than they have in the U.S. the power to review
arbitral awards for errors of law.55 Despite giving arbitrators the
power to determine their own jurisdiction, the Act allows a party
“dissatisfied with the arbitrator’s ruling on jurisdiction” to apply to
the High Court “for a determination of the arbitrator’s
jurisdiction.”56 Parties may also apply to a court to “determine any
question of law that arises in the course of the proceedings if the
Court is satisfied that the question substantially affects the
rights of the other party.”57 In these ways, the arbitration process
seems designed to function as a corollary to the public legal system
rather than as a free-standing private alternative.58
54

See GHANA ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION ACT, 2010 § 1.
This provision limits application of the Act to those matters not involving:
(a)

the national or public interest;

(b)

the environment;

(c)

the enforcement and interpretation of the Constitution; or

(d)
any other matter that by law cannot be settled by an alternative
dispute resolution method.
55

See GHANA ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION ACT, 2010 §
26(6)(a)(allowing judicial review of a question that “involves a point of law
which is fundamental to the case”).
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Ghana ADR Act § 26(1).
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Ghana ADR Act § 40(1).
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The Ghana ADR Act limits the scope of judicial review of arbitral
awards to a range of considerations similar to those provided in western statutes,
allowing a court to set aside an award only where:
(a) a party to the arbitration was under some disability or
incapacity;
(b) the law applicable to the arbitration agreement is not valid;
(c) the applicant was not given notice of the appointment of the
arbitrator or of the proceedings or was unable to present the
applicant’s case;
(d) the award deals with a dispute not within the scope of the
arbitration agreement or outside the agreement except that the
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Like the arbitration provisions, the mediation provisions
suggest a conception of mediation that diverges from American
norms. In the U.S., mediation is largely unregulated. No federal
law and very few state laws expressly govern the practice of
mediation as a general matter. The Uniform Mediation Act
promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws had been enacted by eleven states and the
District of Columbia as of 2013,59 but its overriding purpose is to
establish an adjudicative privilege for mediation communications,
providing almost no guidelines for the actual conduct of
mediations.60 In contrast, the Ghana ADR Act governs everything
from the number of mediators61 to the type of pre-mediation
submissions required62 to confidentiality, both within the
mediation and with respect to third-parties.63 It has very broad
application, covering any and all “mediation,” defined as “a
nonbinding process . . . in which the parties discuss their dispute
with an impartial person who assists them to reach a resolution.”64
In terms of methodology, there is an ongoing debate in the
U.S. over the extent to which mediators should inject themselves
into the process to guide the outcome. Professor Len Riskin
captured the competing conceptions of the mediator’s role in his
distinction between “evaluative” and “facilitative” mediation
styles:

Court shall not set aside any part of the award that falls within
the agreement;
(e) there has been failure to conform to the agreed procedure by the
parties;
(f) the arbitrator has an interest in the subject matter of arbitration
which the arbitrator failed to disclose.
Ghana ADR Act § 58(2).
59

http://uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Mediation%20Act.

60

UNIFORM MEDIATION ACT (2003).
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See GHANA ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION ACT, 2010 § 65.
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See id. § 73.
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See id. §§ 78-79.

64

Id. § 135.
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The mediator who evaluates assumes that the
participants want and need her to provide some
guidance as to the appropriate grounds for
settlement—based on law, industry practice or
technology—and that she is qualified to give such
guidance by virtue of her training, experience, and
objectivity.
The mediator who facilitates assumes that the
parties are intelligent, able to work with their
counterparts, and capable of understanding their
situations better than the mediator and, perhaps,
better than their lawyers. Accordingly, the parties
can create better solutions than any the mediator
might create. Thus, the facilitative mediator
assumes that his principal mission is to clarify and
to enhance communication between the parties in
order to help them decide what to do.65
While a great deal of evaluative mediation undoubtedly takes
place in the U.S., the weight of scholarly authority seems to favor
the facilitative approach.66 The Model Standards of Conduct for
Mediators, a joint effort of the American Arbitration Association,
the American Bar Association, and the Association for Conflict
Resolution, admonish mediators to “conduct a mediation based on
the principle of party self-determination,” and explain that “[s]elfdetermination is the act of coming to a voluntary, uncoerced
decision in which each party makes free and informed choices as

65

Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediators’ Orientations,
Strategies, and Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV.
7, 24 (1996).
66

See, e.g., Lela P. Love, The Top Ten Reasons Why Mediators Should
Not Evaluate, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 937, 938 (1997)(“[T]he role of mediators
is to assist disputing parties in making their own decisions and evaluating their
own situations.”); Joseph P. Stulberg, Facilitative Versus Evaluative Mediator
Orientations: Piercing the “Grid” Lock, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 985, 1001
(1997)(“Mediation is neither a process designed to marshal evidence leading to
an advisory opinion by a third party, nor a rehearsal trial in front of judge orjury.
Rather, mediation is a dialogue process designed to capture the parties' insights,
imagination, and ideas that help them to participate in identifying and shaping
their preferred outcomes.”).
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to process and outcome.”67 The emphasis on “informed choices”
implies that it is not the mediator’s job to inject any particular
normative principles—whether of law, justice, morality, or
something else—into the process. Indeed, the standards assume
that mediators will not guide the parties on the substantive issues,
advising mediators merely to “make the parties aware of the
importance of consulting other professionals to help them make
informed choices.”68
The Ghana ADR Act seems to encourage a mediation style
that, in American practice, would be considered highly directive
and evaluative. It gives control of the process to the mediator: “A
mediator may conduct the mediation proceedings in a manner that
the mediator considers appropriate, but shall take into account the
wishes of the parties . . . .”69 It declares that mediators “shall be
guided by principles of objectivity, fairness and justice, and shall
give consideration to, among other things, the rights and
obligations of the parties, the usages of the trade concerned and the
circumstances surrounding the dispute, including any previous
business practices between the parties.”70 To the American ear,
that guidance sounds closer to a standard for arbitrators than for
mediators. In suggesting normative factors a mediator should take
into account, it implies that the mediator plays an active role in
guiding the parties to a substantive outcome. The Act expressly
gives mediators the power to “formulate the terms of a possible
settlement and submit them to the parties for their
considerations.”71
If the arbitration and mediation provisions offer somewhat
different approaches and emphases from their American
counterparts, the provisions governing customary arbitration have
no corollary at all. They represent an attempt to bring customary

67

MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS Standard I(A)

68

MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS Standard I(A)(2)

69

Ghana ADR Act § 74(6).

70

Id. § 74(5).
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Ghana ADR Act § 81(1).

(2005).
(2005).
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arbitration within the ambit of a national, judicially directed system
of dispute resolution.
For the most part, the Act’s procedural rules on customary
arbitration incorporate traditional practice. For example, the Act
codifies the submission of disputes to customary arbitration,
including the payment of “a fee or token.”72 It requires customary
adjudicators “to apply the rules of natural justice and fairness” and
not “to apply any legal rules of procedure in the arbitration.”73 But
it also adds procedural requirements that reflect concerns about
efficiency found in court rules, such as a requirement that
customary arbitrators issue an award within twenty-one days of the
first hearing absent a contrary agreement among the parties and the
arbitrator.74
Beyond regulating the process of customary arbitration, the
Act brings customary arbitration formally under the auspices of the
courts in two main ways. First, it incorporates rules for courts to
refer matters before them to customary arbitration with the consent
of the parties.75 In this way, it effectively deputizes traditional
adjudicators to serve as judicial surrogates in appropriate cases.
Second, both for cases delegated to customary arbitration from the
courts as well as for cases initiated in the chiefs’ courts, it confers a
right of judicial review, empowering a party “aggrieved by an
award” to apply to a court to set it aside upon a showing that the
award “(a) was made in breach of the rules of natural justice, (b)
constitutes a miscarriage of justice, or (c) is in contradiction with
the known customs of the area concerned.”
Taken together, the rules for commercial arbitration,
mediation, and customary arbitration in the Ghana ADR Act entail
a convergence of three dispute resolution models into a unified,
quasi-public system of alternative dispute resolution. The
traditional adjudicators—the chiefs and queen mothers—retain
their authority to hear matters involving customary law. In that
forum, the moral considerations that underlie traditional Ghanaian
society remain paramount, reflected both in the nature of the
72

Ghana ADR Act § 90.
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75

Ghana ADR Act § 91.
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process and in the substantive norms that guide decisions. But the
traditional courts have been formally integrated into the court
system, much like courts of limited jurisdiction. Cases within their
legal jurisdiction can be referred to them, and their decisions are
reviewable by the courts of law.
The Act then establishes alternatives to both customary
adjudication and the courts of law in the form of commercial
arbitration and mediation—processes imported from the western
ADR model. These processes have modern roots in the western
autonomy value. Arbitration—both in the west and in Ghana—is
made viable by legal rules allowing parties to opt out of the
(public) court system and choose their own (private) decisionmaker. Although the parties subject themselves to the
determination of a third-party, they do so voluntarily, by way of
private contract. The arbitrator’s role is to carry out the parties’
agreement; the arbitrator should not import either legal rules or
customary norms except to the extent the parties have tasked him
with doing so. Mediation is entirely a function of party consent,
and western mediators are expected to act primarily as facilitators
helping the parties find their way to a negotiated resolution.
Negotiation, in turn, is widely understood in the west to involve
autonomous actors seeking to make trades based on self-interest
and the rational invocation of market-based norms.76
The Ghanaian versions of commercial arbitration and
mediation limit party autonomy by injecting legal norms into the
process and, in the case of arbitration, imposing greater court
oversight than that found in the U.S. They assume an active role
for the neutral that reflects social recognition of hierarchical
decisionmaking even for processes ostensibly defined by party
consent. The respect for authority that is a fundamental feature of
traditional societies valorizing community and sanctity remains a
76

See ROGER FISHER ET AL., GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING
AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 10-11 (2nd ed. 1991). By far the most
influential negotiation text in the English language, Getting to Yes posits a
vision of “principled negotiation” resting on four principles: 1) separate the
people from the problem; 2) focus on interests, not positions; 3) generate a
variety of possibilities before deciding what to do; and 4) insist that the result be
based on some objective standard. Id. The underlying assumption is that people
are autonomous actors, freed from the constraints that social relationships entail
(“separate the people from the problem”) and entitled to claim benefits based on
their “interests,” as tested for fairness by reference to “objective standards.”
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powerful influence in Ghana’s evolving dispute resolution system.
The Ghana ADR Act has one foot in the western, autonomy-based
model of private dispute resolution, but the other in a traditional
model in which distinctions between the public and the private are
much blurrier and in which community-based values take
precedence.
VI.

THE ADR ACT IN PRACTICE: INITIAL EVIDENCE

Whatever the intentions behind the ADR Act, its
importance will be determined by its implementation. A
sufficiently large group of neutrals must be available to mediate
and arbitrate appropriate disputes, and the processes they use must
meet the needs of those disputing parties. To date, forty-seven
district and circuit courts have instituted court-connected
mediation programs, with a goal of full implementation into all
courts by 2017. In 2012-13, almost 5,000 cases were mediated
through those programs, with a settlement rate of just under 50%.77
Implementation has gone furthest in the major metropolitan areas.
The mediation trainings I participated in were undertaken to extend
the pool of qualified mediators in the more rural, Brong-Ahafo
region.
Consistent with the expressed desires of our Ghanaian hosts
and colleagues, the trainings imparted a facilitative model of
mediation, while acknowledging the subtle differences in emphasis
between the Ghana ADR Act and western standards of conduct for
mediators. One of the most striking aspects of the experience was
the participants’ response to the facilitative model of mediation.
Although few of the participants came in with any knowledge of
the Ghana ADR Act, they tended to assume, as it does, that the
third-party neutral would do more than disinterestedly facilitate the
disputants’ autonomous negotiations. When playing the role of
mediators, the participants typically expected to be paid deference
(at least initially). And when playing the role of disputants, they
invariably looked to the neutral for guidance on everything from
process to outcome (again at least initially). And whenever a chief
was in the room, everyone looked to the chief for guidance (both
initially and thereafter). The notion that the disputants “owned”
their dispute, in the terminology we sometimes use in the west,
77

See Nolan-Haley & Annor-Ohene, supra note 47.

26

STATUS AND CONTRACT IN AN EMERGING DEMOCRACY
seemed foreign to many participants. It did not fit with their
traditional cultural norms.
Despite the unfamiliarity and initial hesitation, however,
many of those participants seemed eager to engage in processes
that emphasized party autonomy and equality. In particular, the
professionals with whom we interacted recognize the benefits of
western-style economic development. Some see the hierarchy of
traditional authorities as hidebound and unaccountable, if not
corrupt.78 They embraced western-style ADR as a forwardthinking alternative to anachronistic chiefs and sclerotic courts—
one that could help Ghana’s development into a modern economy
benefitting from western engagement.
Initial research into the perceptions of participants in courtconnected mediation in Ghana suggests that disputants often have
the same reaction to mediation that the trainees had. They are often
surprised by the absence of a third-party empowered to make
decisions. At the same time, however, many seem to embrace the
more western-style emphasis on autonomy they find in courtconnected mediation. In the summer of 2013, Jacqueline NolanHaley and Rev. James Kwasi Annor-Ohene surveyed fifty-four
litigants who had participated in court-connected mediations
conducted by mediators trained at the Marian Conflict Resolution
Center, asking them a series of questions focusing on their
perceptions of the procedural justice of the process in comparison
with other processes.79 While the sample is relatively small, the
responses suggest that most mediators used a facilitative style and
that most respondents reacted positively to the emphasis on
autonomy that style entails.
The respondents overwhelmingly reported that the
mediators gave them time to speak, treated them fairly, and did not
pressure them to accept a settlement. Those responses are at least
consistent with the conclusion that the mediators employed a
mediation style placing a premium on party autonomy. The
individual responses confirm that most respondents felt that their
autonomy had been respected and liked that dimension of the
78

Concerns about judicial corruption, specifically reports that litigants
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process. In describing things they liked about the mediation,
parties said:
“I was given the opportunity to express myself.”
“Everyone was given the opportunity to express himself.”
“The mediators gave much respect to me and allowed me to
express myself freely.”
“That mediators treated parties with respect.”
“The explanation of the ground rules. My right to
terminate the session if I didn’t wish to continue.”
“Fairness. Respect.”
Notably, most of the respondents had never participated in
a formal customary adjudication before a chief or queen mother. In
addition, more than half were plaintiffs in civil lawsuits. So the
particular pool surveyed may be more comfortable with processes
emphasizing autonomy than other Ghanaians experienced in
customary adjudication. And even among this pool, a number of
respondents expressed frustration with the relative lack of structure
and the absence of a decision-maker. Responses to a question
about things they did not like about mediation included:
“liberal nature of the process”
“too much liberty for the parties”
“The other party was allowed plenty of time to speak”
“wanted the mediator to pronounce judgment”
“the respondent was not punished enough”
As those responses suggest, the same characteristics that one
disputant considers a virtue may be considered a drawback by
another disputant.
VII. CONCLUSION
Ghana’s ADR project is a bold experiment in melding
traditional and modern dispute resolution processes. Because those
processes rest on different sets of values, the alchemy Ghana is
attempting will challenge customary norms about the roles of
parties and neutrals in resolving disputes. Much more study is
required to assess how mediation is being employed and received
in Ghana. But the limited data available suggests that many
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Ghanaians welcome the introduction of dispute resolution
processes like western-style mediation that emphasize party
autonomy.
Whether the traditional authorities share the more
cosmopolitan Ghanaians’ enthusiasm for these trends is another
question. I spoke with more than one chief who lamented a
perceived indifference to the chiefs’ concerns in the drafting and
enacting of the Ghana ADR Act. Given the prominent role the
traditional adjudicators still play in Ghanaian life, their acceptance
and participation will likely play an important role in the success,
or failure, of Ghana’s ADR experiment. Ghana simply does not
have the resources to pay a cadre of professional neutrals large
enough to meet the demand for dispute resolution services. The
chiefs are, and will remain for the foreseeable future, key cogs in
the dispute resolution system.80
The success of Ghana’s ADR experiment will likely hinge
on its ability to bring together the traditional authorities and the
modernizers in the legal establishment to create a system of
alternative dispute resolution that is perceived as legitimate and
effective. The system that emerges will look very different from an
American court-connected ADR program, as it must. It will almost
certainly include both elements of the traditional processes and
western innovations. It will respect traditional values associated
with community, sanctity, and structures of authority, while also
emphasizing party autonomy, fairness, and equity. Its success will
not be known for years. But if it does succeed, it may provide a
valuable model for other emerging nations to follow.

80

Informal reports from the Marian Conflict Resolution Center indicate
that at least one of the chiefs who participated in the training has gone on to
become a mediator in court-referred cases, successfully mediating a number of
cases to settlement.
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